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A DOCTRINE ADRIFT: LAND USE REGULATION AND
THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LA WTON v.
STEELE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
Susan Boyd
Abstract: Although substantive due process theory has lost much of its force as a local

policymaking tool in the federal courts, the doctrine has played a significant role in the land
use policies of Washington State. Relying on an ancient U.S. Supreme Court case, Lawton v.
Steele, the Supreme Court of Washington has declared that legislation permitting government
to pass the social costs of low-income housing demolition on to individual developers through
development impact fees is "unduly oppressive" on those individuals and thus violates
substantive due process. This Comment argues that the substantive due process doctrine the
Supreme Court of Washington has applied is irrelevant under the Federal Constitution and
inconsistent with Washington constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, the Comment asserts
that the substantive due process theory of Lawton v. Steele inappropriately permits courts to
delve into the policymaking role of legislators.

In the past three decades, the social and environmental costs of rapid
growth in Washington State have prompted legislation permitting local
governments to shift some of these costs from the public to individual
developers.' The Supreme Court of Washington, searching for a method
to evaluate the constitutionality of such regulations, lighted on the
substantive due process test2 from a century-old U.S. Supreme Court
case, Lawton v. Steele.3 As summarized by the Supreme Court of
Washington, the Lawton test balances the public's interests against those

1. See Robert D. Tobin, MandatoryDevelopment Conditions3-7 (1986) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the WashingtonLaw Review). Tobin explains:
In response to heightened public awareness of environmental impacts and of the public cost of
land development which occurred in the 1960's and 1970's, a new set of land use concepts and
laws emerged. A characteristic of these and other modem land use regulations is an emphasis on
the effects of development with regard to a specific site, lot or project
Id. (citations omitted). This Comment refers to several cost-shifting statutes, including the 1971 State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), Wash. Rev. Code § 43.21C (1998); the 1971 Shoreline
Management Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58 (1998); and the 1968 State Subdivision Act, Wash. Rev.
Code § 58.17 (1998). More recently, the Washington Legislature enacted the 1990 Growth
Management Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A (1998), authorizing municipalities to assess
development impact fees to fund various public facilities.
2. In Orion Corp. v. State, the Supreme Court of Washington explained at length its preference for
using a substantive due process doctrine over a Fifth Amendment takings doctrine to evaluate land
use restrictions. 109 Wash. 2d 621,645-52, 747 P.2d 1062, 1075-78 (1987).
3. 152 U.S. 133 (1894). See infra text accompanying notes 66-75.
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of the regulated landowner and lodges wide discretion in the court.4
Noting this broad judicial discretion, the Supreme Court of Washington
has invoked the Lawton substantive due process standard5 to invalidate a
number of important legislative efforts to manage the impacts of growth.6
Although Lawton has played a significant role in contemporary
Washington State land use law,7 the viability of the Lawton substantive
due process test as a federal or state constitutional standard is at best
questionable. Part I of this Comment briefly describes development
impact fees, the particular regulatory tool upon which the Lawton test has
had its most chilling effect. It then describes what has become of federal
substantive due process jurisprudence since Lawton and analyzes the reemergence of Lawton in the Supreme Court of Washington's
constitutional jurisprudence. Part II asserts that the federal roots of
Lawton v. Steele dried up long ago and that there are no grounds for rerooting the doctrine in the state constitution. Finally, this Comment
maintains that the current Washington substantive due process doctrine,
relying on Lawton, permits an inappropriate level of judicial intervention
into the legislative tasks of social policymaking and planning.8

4. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 331, 787 P.2d 907, 913 (1990).
5. The Supreme Court of Washington distinguishes between the substantive due process standard
applied when plaintiffs seek only to have a regulation invalidated and the standard applied when
they seek federal civil rights damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The Lawton standard applies
only when the remedy sought is invalidation. When a substantive due process challenge to a
regulation is based upon the federal civil rights law, the standard has been articulated as "arbitrary
and capricious or irrational, or utterly fails to serve a legitimate purpose." Robinson v. City of
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 61, 830 P.2d 318, 334 (1992). There has been much controversy over the
application of the § 1983 "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Petitioner's Supplemental Brief at
9-14, Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 934 P.2d 1179 (1997) (No. 62820-3) (discussing
court's inconsistent interpretations of § 1983 "arbitrary and capricious" standard). This Comment
does not address this controversy.
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. Much of this analysis requires a specific contextual perspective, so while it undoubtedly has
implications for other applications of substantive due process, the analysis is primarily concerned
with the doctrine as applied to development impact fees.

Substantive Due Process
I.

THE CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES AND THE
ROLE OF LAWTON IN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW

A.

Development Impact Fees

State and local land use policies often include the use of development
impact fees' Governments impose impact fees on real estate developers
in exchange for permission to develop property." Such fees assist
governments in mitigating the various financial and social impacts of real
estate development. The rationale behind development impact fees, also
known simply as "impact fees" or "exactions," is that certain public
needs are attributable to new development; therefore, the government
may require that development itself internalize the cost of these needs. 1"
Used in this way, impact fees become important tools of social policy. 2
In Washington, as in many other states, state and local governments
increasingly rely on development fees to pay the costs of growth
management objectives such as maintenance of public facilities and
transportation infrastructure, environmental preservation, and affordable
housing. 3 Shifting the cost of these public benefits to individual
landowners is controversial; but, subject to certain restrictions, it has
been generally accepted in Washington as one means of managing
growth. 4 The Washington Legislature and courts control the extent to
which governments can shift these costs to individuals through various

9. See Alan A. Altshuler & Jos6 A. G6mez-Ibai.ez, Regulation for Revenue: The Political
Economy of Land Use Exactions 35-39 (1993) (describing increased incidence of development
impact fees throughout country).
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Id.
12. Dedications of land or easements and construction of improvements are other common forms
of legislatively-imposed development conditions. Statutes allowing for the imposition of
development conditions often leave room for the legislature to determine whether the condition will
be a fee or some other kind of dedication. For example, the Washington subdivision statute states
that impact fees, dedications of land to a public body, or the provision of public improvements to
serve the subdivision may be required as a condition of subdivision approval. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 58.17.110(2) (1998).
13. See generally Exactions, Impact Fees and Dedications: Shaping Land.use Development and
FundingInfrastructure in the Dolan Era (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995); King
County Comm'n on Impact Fees, Impact Fees: Recommendationsfor the Region's Policy Makers
(1992) [hereinafter Impact Fees].
14. Since the late 1960s, Washington law has permitted the imposition of development conditions
where the development was expected to result in particular public burdens. See supranote 1.
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statutory' 5 and constitutional16 rules. The constitutional doctrine of substantive due process has been the most controversial of these rules.
B.

FederalSubstantive Due ProcessLaw

Identifying a cohesive federal substantive due process theory in the
particular context of land use regulation, or even in the broader category
of economic regulation, is virtually impossible. First, the U.S. Supreme
Court has rebuffed assertions of substantive due process rights in land
use cases for nearly forty years. 7 Second, recent opinions from the Court
defining the role of substantive due process in other contexts foster doubt
about the doctrine's continued vitality in the land use context. 18 Finally,
the federal circuit courts have filled the doctrinal void with divergent
theories, at least two of which explicitly abandon the concept of
substantive due process protection of land use rights."'
More than a century ago, in Lawton v. Steele," the Court articulated
the principles invoked in the Supreme Court of Washington's substantive
due process jurisprudence. In Lawton, the Court held that an exercise of
the state's police power that interferes with land use rights must: (1) be

15. Most development fees in Washington are authorized under Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020
(1998). Under this statute, a local government may condition property development upon dedications
or fees as long as such conditions are "reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development or plat." Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020(3); see, e.g., Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County,
124 Wash. 2d 261, 273, 877 P.2d 187, 193-94 (1994) (holding that impact fees to pay for park
development were reasonably necessary as direct result of plaintiff's development).
16. Other than substantive due process, the primary constitutional doctrine applied to
development fees is the takings doctrine. In Sparks v. Douglas County, Washington adopted the U.S.
Supreme Court's test for determining when a development exaction becomes a taking. 127 Wash. 2d
901, 904 P.2d 738 (1995). Under this test, a condition placed on development must serve to mitigate
the harm directly caused by the development and must be quantifiably related to or "roughly
proportionate" to that harm. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987)
(holding that condition on development meets takings challenge only if there is "essential nexus"
between condition placed on development and impact caused by development); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that in addition to having "essential nexus" to anticipated
impact, development exaction must be "roughly proportionate" to anticipated impact of
development). Although Nollan and Dolan dealt with exactions of property as opposed to exactions
of money, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to exactions in the
form of impact fees as well. See Erlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (remanding
challenge to impact fee to be considered under Dolan analysis).
17. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
20. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).

Substantive Due Process
required by the public interest, (2) use means reasonably necessary for
accomplishing the purpose, and (3) not be unduly oppressive upon
individual property owners."
The Lawton Court described this three-pronged test as the means for
subjecting legislative activities to the supervision of the courts.' Courts
exercised this supervision primarily under the "unduly oppressive"
inquiry, in which they balanced the public needs and private interests
affected by the challenged legislation.' Although the Lawton Court
upheld the challenged legislation,24 in the years following it used the
Lawton approach to invalidate a number of laws regulating economic
activity. Lochner v. New York' marked the height of this era of judicial
activism in economic policymaking. In Lochner, typical of other
economic regulation cases of its time,2 6 the Court struck down legislation
limiting the working hours of bakers to sixty hours per week as a
violation of substantive due process.2 7 The Court found that although the
claimed justification for the legislation was public health, the real
purpose was "simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master
and his employees.., in a private business."2' The Court held that such a
purpose29 was beyond the constitutional bounds of the state's police
power.
By the 1930s, a series of cases pronounced the end of the nownotorious "Lochner Era." The Court rejected the notion that courts
should supervise legislative activity and upheld state legislative attempts
to deal with the significant problems of the day by regulating economic
behavior.30 These cases specifically repudiate the use of substantive due
21. Id at 136-37.
22. Id. at 137.
23. Id. at 140-41.
24. Id. (holding that state legislation providing for confiscation of fishing equipment used in
violation of state's fish and game law was justified by state interest in regulating human impact on
wildlife).
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down law prescribing

minimum wage for women), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating statute prohibiting contracts in which employees
agreed not to join labor unions as violation of employer's due process).
27. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
28. Id at 64.

29. Id. at58.
30. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (holding that statute fixing maximum
compensation employment agency may collect for services does not deny due process of law); West
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process as a tool for the courts to use in implementing their own social
policies.3
More contemporary U.S. Supreme Court opinions regarding state and
local regulation of economic activity remain highly deferential to
legislative determinations in the face of substantive due process
challenges and drop any reference to an "unduly oppressive" inquiry.
The Court explains that the burden of substantive due process is met by
showing that a rational public purpose justifies a regulation; no balancing
of public and private interests is necessary. 32 Further, these opinions
explicitly decline any policy oversight role, 33 explaining that "courts do
not substitute their.., economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
bodies."34
The Court has not completely ignored Lawton since the 1930s, but its
brief and infrequent appearances since that time fail to revive its implicit
doctrine. In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, the Court, reviewing an ordinance
restricting the depth to which sand and gravel pit operators could
excavate, 35 gave a qualified endorsement of Lawton's three-pronged
"classic statement of the [police power] rule."36 Recognizing a
presumption of constitutionality in local land use regulation,37 the Court
explained that the Lawton test must not be applied with strict precision

because "'debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts
but for the Legislature.'",38 The Court upheld the challenged legislation,
CoastHotel, 300 U.S. 379 (upholding minimum wage legislation and overruling Adkins); Nebbia v.
City of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding New York's Milk Price Control Act under
substantive due process challenge, reasoning that "a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy
may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare").
31. Olsen, 313 U.S. at 246 (stating that it is legislature's role, not court's, to evaluate "wisdom,
need, or appropriateness" of legislation).
32. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1984) (explaining
that "legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life" are presumed
constitutional, and that complaining party must show that legislature acted in arbitrary and irrational
way to establish violation of due process) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
15 (1976)).
33. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973)
(upholding state law denying plaintiff's application for pharmacy permit, reasoning that "[w]hether
the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is of
no concern of ours").
34. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
35. 369 U.S. 590, 591 (1962).
36. Id. at 594.
37. Id. at 596.
38. Id. at 594 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 289 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)).

Substantive Due Process
stating that although the ordinance prohibited a beneficial use to which
the property had previously been devoted, the plaintiff pit operators had
not overcome the presumption.39 Despite invoking the long-ignored
Lawton test, Goldblatt appears to advance only the most deferential
standard of review.
Since Goldblatt, the Court has not applied a substantive due process
analysis to a land use regulation,4" although it has had the opportunity to
do so. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the
plaintiff challenged the City's historic site designation of Grand Central
Station on substantive due process grounds, but the Court ignored the
plaintiff's theory and treated the case as a regulatory takings claim.4'
Penn Central reaffirmed the highly deferential standard of review
advocated in the economic regulation cases discussed above.42
Recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions suggest that as a matter of
constitutional construction, the Fifth Amendment's due process clause is
no longer an appropriate source of substantive property rights. In
Graham v. O'Connor43 and again in Albright v. Oliver,4 the Court
announced that "[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion
of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
claims."'45 Although these cases involved complaints made against the
government under the Fourth Amendment,4 6 the Court's language invites
broader application.

39. Id. at 596.
40. In Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that, because of
its definition of "family," prevented two cousins from living with their grandmother. 431 U.S. 494
(1977). Although the ordinance in question was a land use ordinance, the Court's reasoning appealed
not to the family members' land use interests, but to their liberty interest in being able to live
together as a family. Despite this reasoning, the Supreme Court of Washington cites this opinion as
support for its contention that land use rights should be protected under substantive due process. See
Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586,609 n.10, 854 P.2d 1, 14 n.10 (1993).
41. 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). The New York Court of Appeals had upheld the city's historic
landmark preservation ordinance against the plaintiff's substantive due process challenges. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977).

42. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
43. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

44. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
45. Id. at 273 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).

46. In Graham, the Court reviewed a substantive due process claim brought against a law
enforcement official for use of excessive force. 490 U.S. at 386. The Court held that the Fourth
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At least one federal circuit court interpreted these cases to mean that
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment4 7 ought to be the sole source
of protection for land-use rights. In Armandariz v. Penman, the Ninth

Circuit, noting both the lack of interest the Court has taken in substantive
due process claims and the Graham-Albrightreasoning, held that there is
no substantive due process protection for land use interests.4 8 The court
reasoned that, like the Fourth Amendment in Albright and Graham, the
Takings Clause provides explicit textual protection for property rights
and therefore ought to be the exclusive source of property rights
protection."

In addition, the Seventh Circuit has struck its blow against substantive
due process. In Gosnell v. City of Troy, the court described substantive
due process as an "oxymoron" that has the "distinct disadvantage, from
the plaintiffs' perspective, of having been abolished in the late 1930's
when the Supreme Court threw over Lochner v. New York." 50 The
Amendment provided the cause of action because it supplies the explicit textual source of
constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures of the person. Id. at 395. The Albright Court
affirmed this reasoning in an action against the state government for initiating a criminal prosecution
without probable cause. 510 U.S. at 268. The Court explained that "[t]he Framers considered the
matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it." Id. at 274.
47. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....
").
48. 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996).
49. Id.The Ninth Circuit has recently applied the reasoning of Armandariz in two other land use
cases: Garneauv. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998), and Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d
1125 (9th Cir. 1997). Macri announced again that a substantive due process claim would not be
heard in a land use complaint, explaining that the Due Process Clause must be expanded only with
the greatest care and its protection should be reserved for those liberties "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 1128 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)). Garneau is of particular interest because the court had the opportunity to apply either
state or federal substantive due process law to a Seattle ordinance that the Supreme Court of
Washington had declared violative of substantive due process. See infra notes 102-10 and
accompanying text. The court completely ignored any substantive due process claims and held only
that the plaintiffs had not shown sufficient economic injury to constitute a taking. The district court
below had briefly addressed the plaintiff's claim under substantive due process. See Gameau v. City
of Seattle, 897 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Wash. 1995), aff'd, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998). It explained
that under the then established "arbitrary and irrational" standard, the ordinance is constitutional. Id.
at 1324.
In addition to reviewing the Seattle Tenant Relocation Assistance Ordinance, Seattle, Wash., Mun.
Code § 22.210 (1990), the Garneau court also reviewed the constitutionality of a state law enabling
local jurisdictions to require property owners to pay a portion of reasonable relocation assistance
to low-income tenants upon demolition, substantial rehabilitation, or change of use of low
income residential rental property. Garneau, 897 F. Supp. at 1321 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code
§ 59.18.440(1)).
50. 59 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995).

Substantive Due Process
Gosnell court was willing to recognize the doctrine only as one that
insulates fundamental rights from any governmental intrusion."' The
court held that in the case of land use actions, "[a] municipality may
bring residential development to a halt for strong reasons or weak
reasons,"5 2 and any challenges to such action may only be brought under
the Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. 3
Federal courts that do recognize substantive due process claims in
land use actions remain highly deferential to government policy
determinations.5' Some federal circuit courts will invalidate zoning
actions only if the alleged purpose behind the legislation has no
conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate exercise of the state's
power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 5 Some
circuits will not look to the actual motive behind the action if there is any
conceivable legitimate motive.56 Others will find a violation of
substantive due process where invidious political or discriminatory
motives prompted a zoning action,57 such as where permitting decisions
were influenced by personal animosity 5 or improper financial interest of
a zoning board member.59 Courts occasionally distinguish between quasijudicial land use actions, which require a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest,'" and legislative actions, which only need some
rational reason upon which the decision could have been based.6' In any
case, the most any federal court will require of a legislative land use
action is that it be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

51. ld.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 658.
54. For a general discussion of the various circuit court positions on substantive due process, see
Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992); Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
FundamentalPropertyRights, 85 Geo. L.J 555 (1997).
55. Norton v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 933 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v.
Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 828 (4th Cir. 1995)).
56. Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 244-45
(1st Cir. 1990).
57. See, e.g., Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991).
58. Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 1988); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d
1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1988).
59. DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 602 (3d Cir. 1995).
60. Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475,486-87 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, Tate, Politz,
Johnson & Williams, JJ., dissenting).
61. RRI Realty, Inc. v. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911,914 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989).
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While this test reflects the first two parts of the Lawton test,62 it
completely ignores the "unduly oppressive" inquiry that allows courts to
balance public against private interests.
C.

Washington Law and the Three-ProngedLawton Test

Until 1986, the Supreme Court of Washington had closely aligned
itself with the U.S. Supreme Court, rejecting a policy oversight role for
the courts in economic regulation. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Washington Life & Disability Insurance Guaranty Ass', the court
quoted the U.S. Supreme Court:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.... For protection against abuses by legislatures the people
must resort to the polls, not the courts.63
More particularly, the state supreme court explicitly rejected Lawton's
"unduly oppressive" prong. In Salstrom's Vehicles v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, the court stated that the unduly oppressive nature of a
statute does not provide grounds to overturn it under the due process
clause,' and that a statute should be upheld if it tends to promote the
public welfare and is reasonably related to a public purpose.6"
Subsequent cases relying on Lawton v. Steele and the "unduly
oppressive" test make no reference to Salstrom 's or Aetna Life.
A 1983 article by Professor William B. Stoebuck held out hope for the
re-emergence of Lawton-based substantive due process in federal
courts. 66 In 1986, the Supreme Court of Washington introduced the
Lawton test into Washington case law.67 Since 1990, Stoebuck's article
62. The first two parts of the Lawton test require that legislation must be essential to the public
interest and use means reasonably necessary for accomplishing the purpose. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
63. 83 Wash. 2d 523, 534, 520 P.2d 162, 169 (1974) (upholding state levy assessed on insurance
companies to assure performance of contractual insurance obligations of insurers becoming insolvent
to Washington residents) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
64. 87 Wash. 2d 686, 693, 555 P.2d 1361, 1366 (1976).
65. Id. at 691, 555 P.2d at 1365.
66. William B. Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfalls, and a Better Way, 25 Wash. U. J.
Urb. & Contemp. L. 23 (1983).
67. West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 52, 720 P.2d 782, 786 (1986).

Substantive Due Process
68

and the Lawton test have been applied in a number of land use contexts.
Thus, although the Lawton test the Supreme Court of Washington
adopted no longer reflects federal constitutional law,69 the court has
earnestly applied the Lawton standard to invalidate significant land use
regulation.
The Lawton test has allowed the Supreme Court of Washington a
particularly significant policymaking role in the use of development
impact fees. As directed by Lawton, this role is largely played out in the
"unduly oppressive" prong through a balancing test.70 Although courts
defer to legislative bodies when assessing the first two prongs of the
test-that is, whether a land use regulation is in the public interest and
uses reasonable means to achieve its goalsV-"[t]he 'unduly oppressive'
inquiry lodges wide discretion in the court and implies a balancing of the
public's interest against those of the regulated landowner." 2
This balancing exercise is guided by a set of non-exclusive factors. On
the government's side these factors include "the seriousness of the public
problem, the extent to which the owner's land contributes to it, the
degree to which the proposed regulation solves it and the feasibility of
less oppressive solutions."'73 On the landowner's side the factors include
the amount and percentage of value loss, the extent of remaining uses,
the temporary or permanent nature of the regulation, the extent to which
the owner should have anticipated such regulation, and how feasible it is
for the owner to alter present or currently planned uses.74 The court has

68. In addition to the applications of Lawton that are the subject of this Comment, Lawton has
been applied in other cases. See Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 133 Wash. 2d 647, 667,
946 P.2d 768, 777 (1997) (holding that health district's denial of construction clearance permit on
grounds that septic system was substandard is not violation of substantive due process); Rivett v.
City of Tacoma, 123 Wash. 2d 573, 583, 870 P.2d 299, 304 (1994) (holding that city ordinance
imposing liability on private property owners for conditions of public sidewalks is violation of
substantive due process); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 330-40, 787
P.2d 907, 913-18 (1990) (holding that Lawton is test for substantive due process, but not applying
Lawton in challenge to wetlands ordinance prohibiting development because plaintiff had not
exhausted administrative remedies).
69. See supra Part 1.B, discussing federal substantive due process law.
70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 51, 830 P.2d 318, 329 (1992).
72. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913.
73. Id. (citing Stoebuck, supra note 66, at 33).
74. Id.
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essentially reduced this balancing to the single issue of whether the
regulation places an unfair economic burden on the landowner."
The Lawton test has had its biggest impact in the context of
development fees associated with the demolition or redevelopment of
low-income housing. Invoking Lawton, the Supreme Court of
Washington has declared categorically that an exaction that forces a
developer to pay some of the social costs associated with the demolition
of low-income housing is a violation of substantive due process.76 The
court has reasoned that assessment places a burden on individual
landowners that should be borne by the public.77
In Robinson v. City of Seattle78 and Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle,79 the
court considered the constitutionality of the Seattle Housing Preservation
Ordinance (IPO). ° The HPO required low-rent residential apartment
building owners applying for demolition permits to pay $1,000 in
relocation fees to assist low-income tenants who would be displaced
when the building was demolished."' The ordinance had been invalidated
three years earlier as a violation of a state law prohibiting fees on
development.82 In both Sintra and Robinson, land owners who had been
subject to the ordinance prior to its invalidation brought substantive due
process claims, primarily seeking damages and attorney's fees under
federal civil rights law.83 Although neither case provided the court with
facts sufficient to find a violation of substantive due process for the

75. Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 133 Wash. 2d 647, 664, 946 P.2d 768, 776 (1997)
("Thus, the purpose of this prong is to prevent excessive police power regulations that require the
landowner 'to shoulder an economic burden, which in justice and fairness, the public should
rightfully bear."') (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077
(1987). The Christianson court also cited Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 610-11, 854 P.2d
1, 15 (1993); Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 331; and Sintra, Inc. v. City ofSeattle, 119
Wash. 2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765, 777 (1992)).
76. See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 611, 854 P.2d at 15; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at
331; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 22, 829 P.2d at 777.
77. See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 611, 854 P.2d at 15; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at
331; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 22, 829 P.2d at 777.
78. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318.
79. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765.
80. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 22.210.010 (1996).
81. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 42, 830 P.2d at 324.
82. R/L Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402,409, 780 P.2d 838, 842 (1989) (invalidating
Housing Preservation Ordinance as violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020, which prohibits fees
on development).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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purposes of a federal civil rights violation," the court concluded that the
ordinance on its face violated the Lawton standard." It easily found that
the HPO, directed at an important public interest and using reasonable

means to meet this public interest,86 satisfied the first two prongs of the
test; but, the court denounced the ordinance as "unduly oppressive. ' 87 In
both opinions the court found that the social problems of homelessness

and a lack of affordable housing could not be attributed to an individual
land owner but resulted from complex social and economic conditions."
Thus, each opinion reasoned, it is unjust to shift the costs of such
problems to the individual landowners.8 9 This burden-shifting was held
to be "unduly oppressive," and therefore a violation of substantive due
process.9"
The court affirmed the substantive due process reasoning in Sintra and
Robinson one year later in Guimont v. Clarke.9" In Guimont, the court
struck down a state statute requiring mobile home park owners to pay
relocation fees when park land was redeveloped and low-income mobile

84. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 61, 830 P.2d at 334 (holding that land use decision thatdenies
substantive due process states cause of action under § 1983 only if it is invidious or irrational);
Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 23, 829 P.2d at 777-78 (finding that test for determining whether regulation
violates substantive due process for § 1983 purposes is whether ordinance is "invidious or
irrational," 'prompted by animus," or "deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant
personal property rights").
85. It is not completely clear why the Supreme Court of Washington entered into a constitutional
analysis of the Seattle ordinance in Robinson and Sintra. The ordinance to which the plaintiffs in
those cases were subject had been invalidated earlier in RIL Associates as a violation of a state law
prohibiting fees on development. See supra note 82. Because the plaintiffs challenged the city's
action prior to that invalidation, not the ordinance itself, the constitutional holdings on the ordinance
appear to be dicta. It is possible that the court was sending a disapproving message to the legislature,
which had since authorized tenant relocation assistance fees by statute, rendering the RIL Associates
decision mute. See Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(1) (1998).
86. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 54, 830 P.2d at 330 (holding that HPO satisfied first two prongs of
due process test because it was directed toward legitimate public purpose and used reasonable means
to achieve that purpose); see also Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 21, 829 P.2d at 776 (same).
87. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 330; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 22, 829 P.2d at 776.
88. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 331 (noting that problems of homelessness and
lack of affordable housing are function of how all landowners are using their property); Sintra, 119
Wash. 2d at 22, 829 P.2d at 777 (citing San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 24,
735 P.2d 673, 675 (1987) (finding that ordinance shifts public responsibility of providing such
housing to limited segment of population)).
89. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 331; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 22, 829 P.2d at 777.
90. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 331; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 22, 829 P.2d at 777.
91. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993). Guimont is particularly significant because it relies on
reasoning in Sintra and Robinson that is arguably dicta. See supra note 85.
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home owners were forced to move. 92 Again, the court denied that the
individual landowner's action made any unique contribution to the
problem the statute was designed to address: namely, a lack of affordable
housing options.9" The court reasoned that the government's action
resulted in unconstitutional burden-shifting from the general public to
private landowners.9 4
II.

THE PROBLEM: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AND
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING

Washington's continued dependence on the Lawton test to evaluate
land use regulation is questionable for several reasons. First, as
discussed, federal courts have all but eliminated substantive due process
as a protection for property rights.95 Second, Washington's own
constitutional doctrines make it difficult to root a highly protective
substantive due process doctrine in the state constitution. Third, the
Supreme Court of Washington has demonstrated that the unduly
oppressive inquiry of the Lawton test permits inappropriate judicial
intervention into legislative policy decisions. Given these problems,
Washington should abandon its reliance on Lawton and reconsider the
role of substantive due process in protecting property rights.
Our federalist structure permits state courts to develop independent
doctrines based on their own constitutions,96 but Washington has not
done this for substantive due process. Although the Washington
Constitution contains a due process clause virtually identical to that of
the Federal Constitution,9 7 the Supreme Court of Washington has

92. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 614, 854 P.2d at 16-17 (striking down Mobile Home Relocation
Assistance Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 59.21 (1989)).
93. Id.at 611, 854 P.2d at 15 (finding that individual park owner who desires to close park is not
significantly more responsible for problems of homelessness and lack of affordable housing than rest
of population).
94. Id. at 610, 854 P.2d at 15 (finding that by placing such high cost on park owners, statute
placed "burden of solving housing problems on the shoulders of a few").
95. See supraPart I.B.
96. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (holding that free-speech
clause of California Constitution could be applied by California courts to grant broader free-speech
protections than parallel clause in U.S. Constitution).
97. See Wash. Const. art. I, § 3 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."); U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or

Substantive Due Process
explicitly rooted its substantive due process analysis in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.98 The Washington Constitution is
scarcely mentioned in the Supreme Court of Washington's substantive
due process discussions. 9 Because the Lawton test has disappeared from
federal law and the supreme court has not integrated the Lawton test into
the state constitution, the state's doctrine appears to be adrift, unanchored
in either document.
Members of the Washington judiciary have recently highlighted this
point. Justice Talmadge has described Washington's due process
jurisprudence as "hopelessly out of date"1 and has otherwise criticized
the supreme court's analysis of substantive due process claims in land

use cases.'' While Justice Talmadge does not discuss whether
Washington's substantive due process is a matter of state or federal
constitutional law, his opinions, like those of the majority, assume that
federal law is the appropriate source.
Federal district court Judge Rothstein addressed the issue more
explicitly in Garneauv. City ofSeattle.0 2 In Garneau,the court reviewed
an amended version of the Seattle Tenant Relocation Assistance
Ordinance (TRAO)' °3 and the state law authorizing the city to charge
property, without due process of law...."); U.S. Const amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
98. The Supreme Court of Washington begins almost all discussions of the Lawton substantive
due process test with a citation to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 608,
854 P.2d at 14 (quoting due process language of Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. Constitution but not
referring to Washington Constitution); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 829 P.2d
765, 771 (1992) (placing its discussion of Lawton test under heading "Federal Rights"); see also
Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1987) (equating substantive due
process protection provided by Washington Constitution and U.S. Constitution).
99. The singular exception is Rivett v. City of Tacoma, where the court held that an ordinance
imposing liability on owners of abutting properties for conditions of public sidewalks was "unduly
oppressive," exceeded the city's police powers, and thus violated the Due Process Clause of the
Washington Constitution. 123 Wash. 2d 573, 581-82, 870 P.2d 299, 303 (1994). The mention of the
Washington Constitution in this case appears to be more accident than doctrine, however. The
Washington cases Rivett cited as authority for the substantive due process test name the Federal, not
the state, Constitution as the source of the test Id.
(citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114
Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990); Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d 621,747 P.2d 1062).
100. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 640,683,935 P.2d 555,577 (1997) [SintraII].
101. Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 133 Wash. 2d 647, 667, 946 P.2d 768, 777 (1997)
(citing Armandariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996)); Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131
Wash. 2d 707,724,934 P.2d 1179, 1188 (1997); Sintra I, 131 Wash. 2d at 677, 935 P.2d at 574.
102. 897 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Wash. 1995), aff'd, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).
103. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 22.210.010 (1990). The version of the HPO declared
unconstitutional in Sintraand Robinson required developers seeking permits to demolish low income
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relocation fees to property owners. 1°4 In a footnote, the court explained
that because no argument had been made for an independent analysis of
the state constitution's due process provisions, the court was left to apply
federal law. 0 5 The court held that the ordinance was constitutional
because it was not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare."'0 6 The ordinance reviewed in Garneauwas somewhat different
than the ordinances reviewed in Sintra and Robinson0 7 or the statute
reviewed in Guimont.'lO Nevertheless, the opinion implicitly rejected the
idea that development impact fees, such as the tenant relocation
assistance fee, are categorically unconstitutional. Moreover, by applying
the more deferential federal substantive due process test to an arguably
state constitutional question,0 9 it implicitly rejected the "unduly
oppressive" balancing test applied by the Supreme Court of Washington.
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld Judge Rothstein's opinion, deciding
the case under takings analysis and giving no mention to the substantive
due process doctrine."0
A.

The Gunwall Analysis

As a constitutional doctrine, the Lawton substantive due process test
must find its roots in either the state or federal constitutions. Although

housing to give 120 days notice to tenants and replace a percentage of the low cost units that would
be lost. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 22.210 (1983). Alternatively, the builder could contribute to a
public fund for replacing such units and assist in relocating all low income tenants either by actually
relocating them to comparable housing or paying up to $2,000 in cash or excused rent to each tenant
to cover relocation costs. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 22.210 (1983). The revised version, known as
the Tenant Relocation Assistance Ordinance (TRAO), did not require the developer to replace a
percentage of the lost units or contribute to a replacement housing fund. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code
§ 22.210 (1990). Also, the TRAO requires developers to pay only half the standardized relocation
costs of each tenant; the City is required to pay the other half. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 22.210
(1990).
104. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440 (1998).
105.
106.
1994),
107.

See Garneau,897 F. Supp. at 1322 n.5.
Id. at 1323. (quoting Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.
overruled byArmandariz, 75 F.3d 1311).
See supra note 103.

108. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
109. Garneau,897 F. Supp. at 1322 n.5 (refusing to perform independent analysis of Washington
Constitution because parties had not briefed issue of whether it provides greater protection than U.S.
Constitution with respect to substantive due process and land use regulation); see infra Part II.A.
110. Gameau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).

Substantive Due Process

the federal courts have largely rejected Lawton as the federal
constitutional standard, the Supreme Court of Washington is free to place
the Lawton test under the state constitution, under which broader

constitutional protections may be offered. Under Washington law,
determining whether a state constitutional provision provides broader
protection than a parallel federal provision requires applying a "Gunwall
analysis." The Supreme Court of Washington has never addressed the
issue of whether the state constitution should provide greater substantive

due process protection of land use rights than the Federal Constitution; a
Gunwall analysis demonstrates that it does not.
In State v. Gunwall, the Supreme Court of Washington established a

six-factor test to determine whether a provision of the state constitution
grants broader protection than a similar provision in the Federal
Constitution."' This test asks whether (1) the textual language of the
state constitution is paralleled in the Federal Constitution, (2) there are
significant differences in the texts between parallel provisions, (3) state

constitutional and common law history indicate an intention to grant
broader protection under the state constitution, (4) preexisting state law
grants greater protection than the Federal Constitution has granted,
(5) the inherent structural differences in the Washington and Federal

Constitution counsel finding a difference between the two constitutions,
and (6) the matter is of a particular state or local concern or a matter in
which there is a need for national uniformity."' The court has
consistently required this analysis before adopting an independent state
constitutional standard." 3
111. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986). At least one commentator has criticized
the Gunwall test, arguing that states should be free to apply independent analyses of their own
constitutional provisions regardless of the Gunwall factors. See Linda White Atkins, Federalism,
Uniformity, and the State Constitutions-State v. Gunwall, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 569 (1987).
112. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62,720 P.2d at 812-13.
113. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 128 Wash. 2d 553, 562, 910 P.2d 475, 480 (1996) (rejecting
defendant's assertion that Washington Constitution is more protective of defendant's right to testify
than Federal Constitution, reasoning that although defendant "laid out the six Gunwall factors," he
failed to provide sufficient support for his assertion); State v. Fortune, 128 Wash. 2d 464, 475, 909
P.2d 930, 935 (1996) (affirming defendant's first-degree murder conviction and rejecting
defendant's claim that Due Process Clause of state constitution requires more than Federal
Constitution, noting that "[d]efendant did not make the slightest attempt to address the Gunwall
criteria"); State v. Myles, 127 Wash. 2d 807, 811-12, 903 P.2d 979, 982 (1995) (holding that
defendant's due process claim was to be decided solely under federal constitutional law because
defendant failed to brief Gunwall factors); State v. Mierz, 127 Wash. 2d 460, 473 n.10, 901 P.2d
286, 292 n.10 (1995) (refusing to reach state constitutional issue and reviewing only federal
constitutional protections because plaintiff failed to engage in Gunwall analysis); Forbes v. City of
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The nature of the Gunwall analysis requires that the inquiry focus on
the specific context in which the state constitutional challenge is
raised. 1 4 The Supreme Court of Washington has applied a Gunwall
analysis to the doctrine of substantive due process in at least two criminal
cases, State v. Ortiz"5 and State v. Manussier.16 Because the Gunwall
analysis is specific to context, these cases are not determinative of
whether the state constitution should be interpreted differently in the
development fee context, but they are helpful in guiding the textual and
constitutional history inquiries of the analysis. Given the court's
application of this test to the Due Process Clause in other contexts, it is
difficult to argue for an independent state substantive due process
doctrine for land use interests.
Ortiz and Manussierboth held that the guarantees of substantive due
process in the state constitution were no broader than those in the Federal
Constitution. First, Manussier noted that the parallel provisions in the
Washington and Federal Constitution are nearly identical;".7 thus, the
first two Gunwall factors will always weigh against any independent
state analysis. Second, both found no evidence in Washington's
constitutional history of treating the two provisions differently." 8 Thus,
neither the text nor the history indicates that the framers intended the
state Due Process Clause to grant broader protection than the federal
provision.
Applying the third and fourth Gunwall factors, the court must consider
whether the protections granted under state statutory and common law
show an intent to create a broader protection under the Washington
Constitution. The current state of land use policy in Washington
indicates that this is not the case. In the last fifteen years, responding to
public demands for growth management, environmental protection, and
Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 929, 940, 785 P.2d 431, 436 (1990) (requiring parties to brief Gunwall factors
before court can adopt independent state standard).
114. Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash. 2d 103, 115, 937 P.2d 154, 162 (1997) (holding
that Gunwall inquiry is context specific; thus, where provision has been found to be more protective
in one context it may not provide greater protection in all contexts) (citing State v. Russell, 125
Wash. 2d 24, 58, 882 P.2d 747, 770 (1994)); see also Ramm v. City of Seattle, 66 Wash. App. 15,
24-27, 830 P.2d 395, 400-02 (1992) (holding that article 1, section 7 of Washington Constitution
offers more protection in search and seizure matters but not other privacy matters).
115. 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992).
116. 129 Wash. 2d 652, 921 P.2d 473 (1996).
117. Id. at 679, 921 P.2d at 486.
118. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d at 303, 831 P.2d at 1065 (citing Journal of the Washington State
ConstitutionalConvention, 1889 § 3, at 495-96 (3. Rosenow ed., 1962)).
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housing affordability," 9 the Washington Legislature has gradually
increased the power of government regulators to impose development
fees. Although the earliest development impact fees were invalidated as
unauthorized taxes, 2 ' the legislature has since authorized impact fees to
pay for public roads, parks, open space, recreation facilities, schools, and
fire protection facilities.' Additionally, shortly after the Supreme Court
of Washington's ruling in RIL Associates v. City of Seattle, in which
relocation assistance fees were held to be an impermissible tax on
development," the legislature explicitly authorized tenant relocation
assistance fees."z These statutes apply somewhat vague standards,' 24 but
reflect standards applied in federal development exaction takings
cases. 25 There is no evidence that the legislature has attempted to set a
more protective standard for development fees than that established in
federal law.
Whether the courts have intended to provide broader substantive due
process protection in common law is a more difficult question. As
described above, twenty years ago the Supreme Court of Washington
rejected outright the unduly oppressive test and strict judicial oversight
of economic policies.'26 One might argue that the court's recent use of
the Lawton test, despite its abandonment by the federal courts, shows an
intent to grant broader protection to land use interests than is granted in
the U.S. Constitution. But the Supreme Court of Washington has already
rejected this reasoning. In Ortiz, the defendant argued that the Due
Process Clause in the state constitution afforded a defendant greater
protection than the Federal Constitution when the State, in good faith,
fails to preserve exculpatory evidence. 27 The Washington test on which
119.
120.
Homes
121.

See Growth Management Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.010 (1998).
See San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987); Hillis
v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.02.050-.090 (1998).

122. R/L Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402,409,780 P.2d 838, 842 (1989).
123. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440 (1998).
124. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020(3) (1998) (permitting development conditions
"reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development").
125. Development fees have not been reviewed under the federal substantive
in federal courts, but the "reasonably necessary" standard of the state statute
"essential nexus" standard the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed in Nollan v.
Commission, which held that a condition placed on development must advance
justify a prohibition of the development. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
126. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
127. State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294,302,831 P.2d 1060, 1065 (1992).

Due Process Clause
is embodied in the
California Coastal
the ends that would
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he relied had been adopted from federal decisions that were subsequently
overruled. 8 The court held that because the Washington decisions were
not based on independent state law reasoning, they could not support an
argument that the state constitutional protection was broader than the
federal." 9 Similarly, the Lawton test was adopted from federal opinions
that, while not explicitly overruled, no longer reflect federal law. 30 The
fact that Washington has relied on outdated federal law therefore does
not support an independent state due process doctrine.
Two Gunwall factors weigh in favor of an independent state analysis,
but these two factors do not tip the scale. First, the Supreme Court of
Washington has concluded that the structural distinctions between the
Washington and Federal Constitution always weigh in favor of an
independent state analysis.' 3' Second, courts have consistently
recognized land use issues as inherently local. 13 These factors have not
been decisive in the Gunwall case law, however, and have been
explicitly marginalized in several opinions. 3 3 Because the factors
typically determinative in Gunwall analyses weigh against an
independent state analysis, and the only factors in favor of an
independent analysis tend to be dismissed by the court, there is little
support for a separate, more protective, state substantive due process
doctrine.

128. Id. at 303-04, 831 P.2d at 1065-66.
129. Id.
130. See supra Part I.B.
131. See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 789-90, 940 P.2d 604, 611 (1997) (explaining
that federal constitution is grant of limited power to federal government, and state constitution
imposes limits on states' otherwise plenary power); State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 680, 921
P.2d 473, 486 (1996) (same); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 225, 840
P.2d 174, 186 (1992) (same).
132. See, e.g., Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1991); C-Y
Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1983).
133. See Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 133 Wash. 2d 954, 978, 948 P.2d 1264, 1276 (1997)
(holding that question of whether to award attorney fees in insurance litigation is matter of local
concern yet deciding against independent state analysis); Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132
Wash. 2d 103, 121-22, 937 P.2d 154, 165-66 (1997) (holding that structural distinctions and local
nature of issue, only two factors weighing in favor of granting independent state analysis, are not
sufficient to find broader protection under state constitution); State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 780,
757 P.2d 947, 955 (1988) (holding that obscenity not granted broader protection under state freespeech clause even though issue is largely local concern, and that structural distinctions between two
constitutions reinforces responsibility of Supreme Court of Washington to engage in independent
state analysis when necessary, but does not by itselfjustify such analysis).

Substantive Due Process
B.

Substantive Due Processand Social Policy Decisions

A clever jurist could certainly massage a different result from a
Gunwall analysis of the Due Process Clause. Such is the nature of any
multifactored test. The sanctity of separation of powers provides a more
fundamental reason to reject the current Washington substantive due
process doctrine. Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner articulated a
sentiment that has since carried the day in state and federal courts:' 34
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking,
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States. 3 5
By facially rejecting the tenant relocation assistance provisions in
Robinson, Sintra, and Guimont, the court engaged in precisely the kind
of policy judgment of which Justice Holmes warned. For this reason, any
doubt remaining after the preceding analysis should be resolved in favor
of a revised approach to substantive due process and development fees.
The court's invalidations of development impact fees in Robinson,
Sintra, and Guimont focus on the lack of causal connection between the
problem of homelessness and the developers' actions.' 36 Upon closer
examination, this reasoning falls flat. For example, in Robinson the court
distinguished unconstitutional tenant relocation assistance fees from
permissible environmental mitigation fees authorized under the State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).' 37 The court reasoned that in the case
134. State and federal courts have recognized that subsequent Supreme Court opinions have
vindicated Holmes's dissent See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973); Eastern Enters. v.
Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 159 (1st Cir. 1997); Anderson v. Wagner, 378 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ill. 1978);
People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 888 (Mich. 1992) (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Bym v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 289 N.E. 2d 887, 891 (N.Y. 1972) (Jasen, J.,

concurring).
135. Lochner v. City of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. See supranote 88.
137. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 53, 830 P.2d 318, 330 (1992) (distinguishing
demolition of low cost housing from result when land use would cause direct harm to environment).
SEPA states that government action such as granting a permit for development may be conditioned
upon a landowner's payment of a fee as long as that fee will serve to mitigate specific environmental
impacts and is reasonable. Wash. Rev. Code § 43.21C.060 (1998).
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of environmental mitigations, the landowner's action causes a direct
impact, while in the case of tenant relocation assistance, the landowner
does not.'38 The court explained that in the latter case, the landowner's
use of property does not contribute to the problems of homelessness in
any unique way because the lack of low-income housing results from a
number of economic and social causes independent of one particular
landowner.'39 But, the court's contrast of the environmental impacts of
development and the impacts on low cost housing supply amount to a
distinction without a difference.
Compare low-income housing demolition to a typical scenario
involving environmental impact mitigation fees. Landowner (0) owns
several acres of woodland that happen to support significant wildlife
habitat. 0 decides to develop the land, but the local government
conditions approval of a development permit upon O's payment of a fee
to mitigate the anticipated adverse environmental impacts. 0 is not
uniquely responsible for the vulnerable condition of the protected
wildlife, nor is 0 uniquely responsible for overall diminishing habitat.
Indeed, environmental problems such as habitat loss are undeniably-to
borrow the court's reasoning in Sintra--"brought about by a great
number of economic and social causes which cannot be attributed to an
individual parcel of property."' 40 Yet, the court would evidently
recognize the direct impact of the developer's action on the parcel's
valued habitat while it is unwilling to recognize a "unique" or direct
impact on the supply of low-income housing when a developer
demolishes low-income housing.
When the court examines environmental mitigation fees or traffic
impact fees, 141 it is not concerned with whether the landowner caused the
underlying state of the world, for example, scarce habitat in the case of
environmental mitigation or urban sprawl and auto dependence in the
138. The Robinson court stated:
The extent to which an owner's land or property particularly contributes to a public problem
may in certain instances be determinative, such as in some environmental protection
cases.... The problems of homelessness and a lack of low income housing in Seattle are in part
a function of how all Seattle landowners are using their property.
Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
139. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765, 777 (1992).
140. Id.
141. Traffic impact fees in Washington are authorized under Wash. Rev. Code. § 58.17.110
(1998) and §§ 82.02.050-.090 (1998). Sparks v. Douglas County provides an example of how such
fees are analyzed for constitutionality. 127 Wash. 2d 901, 904 P.2d 738 (1995); see infra note 156.
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case of traffic impact fees. It more reasonably asks whether the
developer's actions will impact his or her property in a way that
compromises the public interest and whether the fee charged the
developer is reasonable compensation for that compromise.'4 2 In contrast,
Sintra, Robinson, and Guimont each ask whether the landowner is
responsible for the root problems of homelessness and a lack of
affordable housing," in other words, for the underlying state of the
world. Tenant relocation assistance fees, then, are distinguished from
environmental impact fees only by the court's opinion that it is bad
policy for developers to pay for the impacts of demolishing low-income

housing.
The court reveals its bias again in its application of the unduly
oppressive balancing test.1" It emphasizes factors that weigh in favor of
the landowner (against regulation) and almost ignores those that weigh in
favor of the government (in favor of regulation). For example, in
Robinson, although the court agreed that the problems of homelessness
and a lack of affordable
housing at which the TRAO is targeted are
"certainly serious," ' 45 it stated that another factor-the extent to which
the owner's use of the land contributes to the problem-is "not
particularly crucial."'" Instead, in both Guimont and Robinson the court
emphasized that distributing the cost of the fees to the community at
large would be less oppressive on the landowner than the development
fee.'47 Because any burden is less oppressive if spread among more
people, this point is nothing more than a truism. Further, with the
exception of the opinion in Sintra, the court has similarly ignored the
actual financial impact of the legislation on the owner.'48 The court

142. See supranote 137 for the SEPA standard and note 15 for the traffic impact fee standards.
143. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
144. See supratext accompanying notes 73-74.
145. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 55, 830 P.2d 318, 331 (1992).
146. Ha
147. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 611, 854 P.2d 1, 15 (1993); Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d
at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
148. In Robinson, the court made no mention of the financial impact In Guimont, the court,
having no actual application of the Mobile Home Relocation Statute before it, envisioned a "worst
case scenario" that would leave the land owner with a "staggering" financial obligation. 121
Wash. 2d at 611-12, 854 P.2d at 15. The court apparently concluded that the potential, as opposed to
the actual, impact on the landowner was sufficient to show that the statute was unduly oppressive,
despite the court's own admission that the amount any owner would have to pay under the statute
would vary from owner to owner. Id.
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critical analysis that will serve
appears to choose only those factors for
149
legislation.
the
invalidating
of
ends
its
As applied in these cases, the court's balancing of the public interest
against the private comes down to a fundamental policy question: Should
developers shoulder any unique responsibility for the loss of low-income
housing resulting from their actions? By posing this question, the court
decides that it, not the legislature, is responsible for "adjusting the
burdens and benefits of economic life."' 50 As discussed, this task was
flatly rejected by both the U.S. Supreme Court' and the Supreme Court
of Washington itself."2
There are of course situations in which it is the court's job to prevent
the will of the many from trampling the rights of the few. Again, Justice
Holmes's words have set the standard:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.' 53
Federal courts have struggled with determining what is included among
our fundamental rights,'54 but unconditioned land development has not
been among the candidates in either federal or Washington courts. Since
the late 1960s, the Washington Legislature has given state and local
governments the ability to condition development upon fee payment or
land dedications as a means of controlling the impacts of growth.' In
such a regulated environment, it is unreasonable to argue that
unregulated land use is a fundamental right like the rights to freedom of
religion, speech, and liberty.

149. Patrick Schneider, Substantive Due Processand JudicialLegislation 15 (1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Washington Law Review).
150. See supranote 32.
151. See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
152. See supranotes 63-65 and accompanying text.
dissenting).
153. Lochner v. City of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
154. Ronald J.Krotoszynski, Jr., FundamentalPropertyRights, 85 Geo. L.J. 555, 583-90 (1997)
(arguing that Supreme Court ought to include property rights among "fundamental rights" protected
by substantive due process, although contemporary Court has not extended such protection to
property rights).
155. Tobin, supra note 1, at 3-7 to 3-8.
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Furthermore, a landowner unjustly burdened by an impact fee is not
dependent on substantive due process for relief. In 1995, the Supreme
Court of Washington adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis for
determining when a development exaction constitutes a taking under the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.'56 Under this standard, the
regulator must provide empirical evidence that the exaction it has levied
on the developer will serve to mitigate the harm directly caused by the
development and that it is quantitatively roughly proportionate to the
anticipated impact.5 7 This is an as-applied analysis'58 and thus prevents a
court from speculating worst case scenarios and ignoring the legislation's
actual impact on landowners and the public. It is not clear how the tenant
relocation assistance provisions would have fared under this standard.
The parties provided little empirical information regarding either the
extent of the problem attributable to the developer's activity or the extent
of the financial impact of the legislation on the developers. While the test
protects the same interests as the substantive due process test, it provides
more guidance to both policy makers and jurists in evaluating
development fees and guards against the policy discretion demonstrated
by the Supreme Court of Washington.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Washington's substantive due process analysis
under Lawton v. Steele raises important theoretical problems. As a
constitutional doctrine, it must rest in either the state or federal
constitutions. The federal courts have abandoned the Lawton approach;
some have even abandoned the concept of substantive due process rights
in property all together. The Gunwall analysis provides the framework in
Washington for determining whether a state constitutional provision
provides broader rights then the federal document. Although the
Supreme Court of Washington has not applied this analysis in a property
rights context, existing Gunwall case law counsels rejecting an

156. Sparks v. Douglas County, 127 Wash. 2d 901, 910-16, 904 P.2d 738, 743-46 (1995)
(finding that "essential nexus" standard in Nollan and "rough proportionality" standard in Dolan are
standards to be applied when assessing development exactions under Takings Clause in
Washington); see also supra note 16.
157. See Sparks, 127 Wash. 2d at 910-16, 904 P.2d at 743-46; see also supranote 16.
158. Garneauinterpreted Nollan and Dolan as inapplicable to facial takings challenges and found
that the Nollan/Dolan as-applied analysis cannot be invoked without specific factual evidence of the
economic impacts on the landowner. Gameau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 1998).
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independent state analysis of the provision. If the Lawton test cannot be
rooted in either the Washington or Federal Constitution, its vitality in
Washington is unfounded. In addition to these theoretical problems, the
court's treatment of tenant relocation assistance provisions illustrates the
extent to which the Lawton test can be used to invade the social
policymaking role of the legislature. The court must confront these
problems and reconcile its own jurisprudence with its own theoretical
framework, the doctrines adopted by the federal courts, and its proper
role in reviewing legislative policy. Disgruntled landowners and the
courts to which they turn for relief ought not forget the powerful tool for
relief to which Justice Holmes referred them: the polls.

